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Abstract: Patent race models assume that an innovator wins the only patent covering a product. 
But when technologies are complex, this property right is defective: ownership of a product’s 
technology is shared, not exclusive. In that case I show that if patent standards are low, firms 
build “thickets” of patents, especially incumbent firms in mature industries. When they assert 
these patents, innovators are forced to share rents under cross-licenses, making R&D incentives 
sub-optimal. On the other hand, when lead time advantages are significant and patent standards 
are high, firms pursue strategies of “mutual non-aggression.” Then R&D incentives are stronger, 
even optimal.  
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Introduction 
At first glance, some firms seem to behave irrationally with regard to patents. Consider 
Oracle Corporation, the software firm that has developed leading, innovative database 
management systems since 1979. Oracle could have obtained a large portfolio of patents on many 
of its well-known innovations, but chose not to. Although patents have been issued on database 
techniques at least since the early 1970s, and especially since 1990, Oracle did not obtain its first 
patent until 1995 and acquired only 161 patents during the 1990s. This was a conscious strategy 
as described by Jerry Baker, Senior Vice President of Oracle: 
Our engineers and patent counsel have advised me that it may be virtually impossible to 
develop a complicated software product today without infringing numerous broad existing 
patents. …As a defensive strategy, Oracle has expended substantial money and effort to 
protect itself by selectively applying for patents which will present the best opportunities for 
cross-licensing between Oracle and other companies who may allege patent infringement. If 
such a claimant is also a software developer and marketer, we would hope to be able to use 
our pending patent applications to cross-license and leave our business unchanged. (USPTO 
Hearings, 1994, my emphasis)  
Other software firms have also obtained a minimal number of “defensive” patents—on average, 
software firms acquire only a quarter as many patents relative to R&D as other firms (Bessen and 
Hunt, 2003). Like Oracle, they neither aim to assert patents against (non-suing) competitors, nor 
do they license all patents that they might possibly infringe, in the hope that other firms will 
follow a similar strategy. Such a strategy of “mutual non-aggression” or “mutual forbearance” 
was also common in the early semiconductor and computer industries.1 
The problem Baker describes is often called a “patent thicket.” These occur when each 
product may involve many patents, in contrast with the one-to-one correspondence between 
products and patents that is assumed in the patent race literature. Recent commentators suggest 
that lower patenting standards encourage patent thickets, creating difficulties for innovators (see 
Gallini, 2002, for a review). When innovators must negotiate with large numbers of 
patentholders, they may face excessive transaction costs (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998), “holdup,” 
and problems of vertical monopoly (Shapiro, 2001). Some researchers propose that cross-
licensing and patent pools may resolve these problems (Merges, 1999, Shapiro, 2001, Lerner and 
                                                       
1 In the semiconductor industry prior to the 1980s, firms licensed key technologies from one or two large firms (AT&T 
initially, then Fairchild and Texas Instruments), but often did not engage in much additional active licensing (Tilton, 1971, Levin, 
1982). Levin writes (1982) “…many semiconductor firms simply neglect to arrange to license all the patents that might conceivably 
be used to block its activity. Typically, most merchant firms regularly review cross-licensing arrangements with technologically 
progressive captive suppliers like IBM and AT&T [who produce only for their own use], but they often infringe on one another' s 
patents. A patent holder typically ignores such infringement, since it is likely to be guilty of reciprocal offense.” This behavior has 
since been replaced by more aggressive cross-licensing (Grindley and Teece, 1997, Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). 2 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
Tirole, 2002). This view differs sharply from earlier skepticism that these institutions might be 
anti-competitive.  
But there is still reason to be skeptical about cross-licensing. This paper argues that 
patent thickets can reduce R&D incentives even when there are no transaction costs, holdup or 
vertical monopoly problems. There are different types of cross-licensing strategies with sharply 
different normative implications. Indeed, in contrast to Oracle, which views cross-licensing as an 
unfortunate last resort, other companies aggressively seek to build large patent portfolios and to 
use them to extract benefits from competitors. For instance, IBM acquired nearly one hundred 
times as many patents as Oracle during the 1990s although IBM’s R&D budget is only about five 
times as large as Oracle’s. IBM expresses their strategy this way: 
The IBM patent portfolio gains us the freedom to do what we need to do through cross-
licensing—it gives us access to the inventions of others that are key to rapid innovation. 
Access is far more valuable to IBM than the fees it receives from its 9,000 active patents. 
There’s no direct calculation of this value, but it’s many times larger than the fee income, 
perhaps an order of magnitude larger. (Smith, 1990) 
Note that IBM now earns nearly two billion dollars per year in royalties. Survey evidence finds 
that many other firms also obtain patents in order to “block competitors” (Cohen et al, 2000). 
Also, note that these are expressly patent portfolio strategies—firms interact over entire 
portfolios rather than over individual patents. Instead of licensing carefully chosen individual 
patents—as in most of the economics literature on licensing—firms in semiconductors, 
electronics and computers negotiate based on the relative heights of their stacks of all related 
patents, and they license entire portfolios for a technology field, including patents for which they 
have not yet filed applications (Grindley and Teece, 1997, Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). 
This paper builds a simple two-firm innovation race model where both mutual non-
aggression strategies and aggressive portfolio cross-licensing strategies emerge as equilibrium 
strategies. I intend this model to explain behaviors observed in industries with complex 
technologies.2 It differs from standard patent race models in two principal ways. First, I model 
patenting as separate from, but complementary to, the performance of R&D necessary to develop 
a product. Because there are many possible patents associated with each product, firms can put 
more or fewer resources into obtaining patents for any given level of product-related R&D. 
Second, I assume that patent infringement and validity are uncertain. A single patent does not 
                                                       
2 In industries with so-called “discrete” technologies, such as chemicals, firms may have largely non-overlapping patent 
portfolios. They do not, in general, practice cross-licensing of whole portfolios, but some forms of portfolio based patenting do occur, 
including “evergreening” and patent “fencing.” 3 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
convey certain monopoly rights, rather each patent provides a positive, but less than certain, 
probability of winning an infringement suit. This means that the more patents a firm has related 
to a given product, the greater the joint probability of prevailing at trial. Consequently, a firm 
with a larger patent portfolio has a greater probability of winning, all else equal, and hence a 
stronger bargaining position in cross-licensing negotiations. 
In this model, patenting itself is an economic activity, trading off the probability of 
winning at litigation against the cost of patenting. Moreover, patentability standards affect the 
cost of obtaining a patent and, thus, they determine the cost of building a patent portfolio. When 
patent standards are high, portfolio building is costly, and firms are more likely to follow a 
strategy where they do not assert their patents. On the other hand, low patenting standards are 
associated with a larger number of patents and aggressive assertion of patents, leading to cross-
licensing.  
When firms do not assert their patents, innovators may still realize rents because of lead 
time advantages. Empirical research finds that firms see lead time advantages and related 
advantages as strong sources of appropriability—stronger than patents, in fact, except in the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries (Levin et al, 1987, Cohen et al, 2000). Lead time 
advantages provide incentives for R&D, and, if the first innovators garner a large enough share 
of potential rents, then R&D levels may be optimal or even supra-optimal. 
On the other hand, when firms cross-license, I find that R&D incentives are sub-optimal 
under general conditions. In contrast to simple “winner-take-all” patent race models, the rewards 
to innovating are shared with other patent holders. In particular, cross-licensing sharply reduces 
the incentive effect of lead time advantages because the winner’s profits are included in the 
bargaining over a cross-license and are shared in the bargaining solution. In addition, aggressive 
cross-licensing involves a higher level of socially wasteful patenting activity. I find that social 
welfare is higher when firms choose mutual non-aggression, except when lead time advantages 
are small or non-existent.  Thus I conclude that, far from remedying the problems caused by low 
patenting standards, aggressive portfolio cross-licensing may be evidence that low patent 
standards are inducing socially wasteful behavior and reducing R&D incentives.  
Finally, I find that aggressive cross-licensing affects firms and industries unevenly. 
Cross-licensing is more likely in mature industries with established products. Moreover, 
incumbent firms obtain a greater share of profits under cross-licensing and, under general 
conditions, their profits are greater when patenting standards are lower. 4 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
This paper addresses a different aspect of patent thickets than some of the previous 
literature. Heller and Eisenberg (1998) raise the concern that transaction costs may become 
prohibitive when firms must bargain with many different patent holders to obtain the rights 
needed to make a product. Merges (1999) argues that patent pools may overcome this contracting 
problem. Patent pools have been formally modeled by Shapiro (2001) and Lerner and Tirole 
(2002) as a problem of vertical monopoly. They specify conditions where multiple firms infringe 
a discrete set of patents with near certainty.  
In contrast, my model concerns horizontal technological competition and bilateral 
negotiation between two firms with uncertain conflicting patents. I identify a problem that occurs 
even without transaction costs, with as few as two firms and without holdup.3 
My model also shares a perspective with Kitch’s “prospect” theory of patents (1977). In 
the prospect model, as well as in this paper, a patent does not embody all the knowledge 
necessary to produce a successful commercial product. However, Kitch implicitly assumes that a 
single patent covers the entire field of knowledge necessary to develop a commercial product; 
this allows the patent holder to exercise exclusive control over commercialization. Kitch argues 
that exclusive control provides the most efficient incentives for commercialization.4 In my 
model, many patents and many patent holders may be involved in developing a commercial 
product. Because no single patent holder exercises exclusive control, Kitch’s argument does not 
hold in this case.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section II 
presents results for the basic innovation race model. Section III extends the model and section IV 
concludes. 
I. Model 
I consider a model with two risk neutral firms, A and B.5 In a simple multi-stage patent 
race model, in the first stage, both firms might sink R&D,  A x  and  B x , then “race” in continuous 
time to discover a single invention, as in Loury (1979). In the final stage, the winner of the 
innovation race obtains a patent and earns monopoly profits, 
M V . 
                                                       
3 It also differs from models of the cross-licensing of individual patents (Eswaran, 1992, Fershtman and Kamien, 1993). 
4 This argument assumes no transaction costs and no asymmetric information regarding the licensing of the patent. This 
may not be realistic. See Bessen (2003). 
5 I also modeled a multi-firm model with free entry. Many of the basic intuitions developed for the two firm case still hold, 
however, results are sensitive to the particular specification of the entry constraint. For simplicity, I present only the two firm case 
here. 5 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
The game here is a bit more complicated. Patenting strategies add an additional 
dimension to each firm’s initial decisions. Firms may make different R&D investments 
depending on whether they intend to assert their patents after innovation or not. This decision 
will, in turn, depend on the expected returns to cross-licensing or litigation compared to the 
returns when firms do not assert their patents.  
The stages of the game are as follows (see Figure 1): 
1. In the first stage, firms sink R&D investments,  A x  and  B x  and they begin acquiring 
patents. Each firm can observe the rate at which the other firm acquires patents (I explain the 
significance of this below). 
2.  The firms acquire  A n  and  B n  patents, respectively, each at total cost  B A i Ci , , = . 
These costs are separate from the costs of performing the product R&D,  i x , although they may 
also involve engineering resources and are related (see below). This sunk cost can credibly 
commit a firm to an assertive strategy. In this stage, the firms then conduct a Poisson innovation 
race where the Poisson hazard depends on the R&D investments,  i x . The stage ends when one 
firm makes a successful innovation. 
3. The firms then decide whether they wish to actually assert their patents or not. If 
neither firm chooses to assert its patents, then the innovating firm goes into production, followed 
by the other firm, which imitates sometime later (allowing the innovator to capture a lead time 
advantage). If one or both firms assert patents, then the firms negotiate a cross-license. If 
negotiations fail, they go to court. The probability of winning at litigation depends on each firm’s 
portfolio size,  i n  (see below). 
 
This stage structure reflects that, with complex technologies, firms obtain patents to 
protect a portion of the technology before they develop all of the knowledge necessary for 
commercial success. Firms logically behave differently during the R&D stage if they intend to 
assert their patents or if they expect their competitor to assert its patents. 
Some details of the model are as follows: 
In practice, firms take considerable time to acquire a large portfolio of patents. I assume 
that firms cannot vary the rate of patent acquisition substantially without incurring large 
adjustment costs. Because players observe their opponent’s rate of patent acquisition in Stage 1, 
they can infer whether their opponent is committing to an aggressive strategy. If so, a player has 
sufficient time in Stage 2 to accumulate a substantial portfolio. This feature of the model avoids 6 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
unrealistic timing games where a player might seek to surprise an opponent by accumulating a 
large portfolio overnight. 
Let the ith firm’s total cost of a patent portfolio depend on the number of patents, n, 
R&D, x, and also on “patenting standards,” S, that is,  ). , , ( i i i x n S C C =  Patenting and product 
R&D are complementary activities in the following sense: greater R&D expenditure may reduce 
the cost of obtaining a patent. This makes sense because product R&D may generate patentable 
ideas or otherwise reduce the engineering resources necessary to obtain a patent.6 The variable S 
includes all policy features that affect the cost of patenting.7 I assume that 
(1) 
0 ) 0 , , ( ) , , 0 (
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The second stage concludes with the innovation race. I assume Poisson hazards  ) ( A x h  
and  ) ( B x h , which are the probabilities that each firm will make a successful innovation between 
times t and  dt t + .  I assume h is increasing, concave and h(0) = 0. Time is discounted at rate r. 
This discounting means that the expected speed of innovation, determined by investment levels, 
affects social welfare. 
In the third stage, one or both firms may decide to assert their patents against the other 
firm. If this occurs,8 then the firms either litigate or cross-license. The value of a patent consists 
entirely of its potential ability to block a competitor through litigation (including counter-suits 
over validity and infringement).9 I assume two conditions that give rise to the strategic licensing 
of whole portfolios. First, the outcome of litigation is uncertain, with probability q that a firm 
may be able to win its suit against its competitor (but not necessarily the counter-suit) such that 
                                                       
6 Patents may be taken out on inventions that the firm actually uses in its product and also on alternative techniques. The 
firm may choose to patent alternative techniques in order to strategically block competitors. So, while R&D may generate some 
patents that require little additional engineering, a large portfolio with many alternative techniques may require a large investment in 
engineering beyond that required for the product itself. Note that the cost of patenting with zero R&D may be prohibitively high. 
7 This includes patent application and renewal fees as well as standards of “non-obviousness,” novelty, utility, subject 
matter, etc. that may impose additional R&D costs on a firm seeking to obtain a patent portfolio of a given size. Patent term affects 
cost in a dynamic model where firms seek to maintain an optimal portfolio size. Patent scope and patent enforcement (litigation costs) 
affect the appropriability each patent conveys, thus affecting the effective cost of quality-adjusted patents. I set the cross derivative of 
cost with respect to S and x to zero for simplicity; this is likely to be quite small.  
8 It is possible that a firm could decide to assert its patents in stage one, yet not want to assert them in stage three. In 
equilibrium this does not occur, so to simplify the exposition I do not discuss this possibility. 
9 In a slightly more complicated version of the model, firms may also obtain patents to block imitators who do no 
independent R&D. In that version, given a non-negative level of imitation costs, no imitators will choose to enter as long as each firm 
that invests in R&D obtains a minimum number of patents. Since I am concerned mainly with modeling the interaction between firms 
that do R&D, I effectively assume this minimum number to be zero without loss of significant generality. 7 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
1 < q . Second, firms can potentially obtain patents on a large number of inventions related to a 
single product and these increase the probability of litigation success, although with diminishing 
returns. That is, q, is an increasing concave function of the firm’s patent portfolio size, n, 
) (n q q = . I also assume, without loss of generality, that q(0) = 0. The winner(s) of litigation are 
able to block competitors and claim any profits earned before and after litigation; I ignore other 
penalties and implicit costs such as those imposed by preliminary injunctions. 
There are then four random outcomes to litigation, determined by the independent 
probabilities,  ) ( A n q  and  ) ( B n q . Temporarily ignoring lead time advantage, the associated profit 
outcomes are: if both firms lose, they each earn 
C V , the competitive level of profits; if just one 
firm wins, it earns monopoly profits 
M V and the other earns 0; and if both firms win, they 
bargain. In the last case, I assume that firms bargain with symmetric threat points and symmetric 
bargaining power, each realizing licensing profits of 
L V . Below, in Section III, I consider the 
case where one firm is an incumbent and thus has a different threat point. In the current case, 
these outcomes are: 
  B loses  B wins 
A loses  C C V V ,  
M V , 0  
A wins  0 ,
M V  
L L V V ,  
 
Without loss of significant generality, I assume that licensing is fully efficient (no 
dissipation of rents) so that 
M L V V 2
1 = . Considering consumer surplus and the dissipation of 
rents, 
(2) 
Soc M L C V V V V 2
1
2
1 0 £ = £ £  
where 
Soc V  is social surplus and this exceeds monopoly profits if there is net consumer surplus. 
The expected outcome from litigation serves as a “threat point” to the bargaining 
problem for the cross-license in stage three. Under license, the joint profit of the two firms is 
L V 2 . I assume that this is larger than the joint expected profit from litigation (say legal costs are 
sufficiently large), so that if firms assert patents, they will always negotiate a cross-license rather 
than litigate. Assuming equal bargaining power, the Nash bargaining solution splits the net 
bargaining surplus. 8 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
Finally, note that I have structured the game so that holdup does not occur. Holdup might 
arise if the innovating firm went into production before the firms negotiated a license. If 
production required fixed costs, then the producing firm would be at a disadvantage during the 
bargaining process. Knowing this, firms would choose to negotiate before going into production. 
In this model, the first innovator knows the other firm’s intent to assert patents and so it can 
initiate bargaining. In a more complex model, firms may lack such information. As Jerry Baker 
of Oracle suggests, firms may acquire patents to protect against a probability that some 
unidentified firm may assert patents. Assuming full information about the identity of potential 
legal adversaries simplifies the model; it does mean, as we shall see, that under mutual non-
aggression firms don’t acquire any patents while in practice the mutual non-aggression strategy 
involves a limited number of defensive patents. Firms may also acquire a limited number of 
patents to protect against knock-off imitation (see footnote 9). 
Lead time advantage 
The exposition so far has ignored lead time advantage. Lead time advantage arises 
naturally in a model where imitation requires time or stochastic discovery. Consider first the 
situation where firms do not assert their patents. One firm innovates first followed by the second 
firm at a later time and the first firm earns monopoly rents during the interim. I assume that the 
associated rents are an exogenous feature of the industry.10 Let f represent the portion of present 
value captured during this interim period. Then under duopoly competition, the winner of the 
innovation race receives 
C M V f V f ) 1 ( - +  and the loser receives 
C V f ) 1 ( - . The first 
innovator gains additional profits relative to the second of 
M V f . Call f the lead time advantage 
and 
M V f  the value of the lead time advantage. 
Now consider the case where firms assert patents. Since the negotiated license is 
determined by litigation outcomes, the value of the lead time advantage will be determined by the 
advantage that the first innovator realizes in the litigated outcome. Assume for the moment that 
litigation is concluded instantaneously before firms begin commercial production. If one firm 
wins at law, then the outcome of litigation is determined as above—the winner has a legal claim 
on any lead time profits earned as well as subsequent profits. If both firms win, then the loser of 
                                                       
10 The lead time before imitation might be a function of industry spillovers, the difficulty of reverse engineering trade 
secrets or other industry characteristics. In a more complex model, the rents earned as a first innovator might also depend on the level 
of R&D investments and thus would be partially endogenous. This is a second order effect I ignore for simplicity of exposition. 9 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
the innovation race has a partial claim on lead time profits earned—these profits become part of 
the “pie” divided in the negotiated license agreement. So, in these cases, the first innovator does 
not realize a greater outcome. Only in the event that both firms lose at trial can lead time 
advantages come into play—this is just the duopoly case. The expected value of the lead time 
advantage in this case is ( )( )
M
B A V f n q n q ) ( 1 ) ( 1 - - . Note that this value is typically much less 
than in the non-assertion case. 
But the first innovator may not be able to realize even this much advantage if litigation 
takes time and the imitator can use this time to catch up. Once a suit is filed, plaintiffs may 
obtain preliminary injunctions.11 More important, customers may be unwilling to purchase an 
innovative product that is threatened with an infringement judgment. Not only do customers risk 
losing the value of their purchase and related complementary investments, but they may also be 
liable for infringement themselves. Moreover, since the average patent suit takes thirty-one 
months (Magreb, 1993) and the loser of the innovation race has opportunities to delay the legal 
proceedings, the lead time advantage is unlikely to outlast a trial. The first innovator will be 
unable to realize significant advantage through litigation and the value of the lead time advantage 
under cross-license can be no greater. 
As an alternative, firms might try to preserve the incentive effect of the lead time 
advantage by using a clever ex ante license.12 Suppose, for example, the firms signed a contract 
in stage one, before sinking R&D investments, and this contract prohibited the loser of the 
innovation race from entering the market for t months after the innovation is made. The winner 
would be able to earn monopoly rents during this period and both firms would earn 
L V  
thereafter. A difficulty with this sort of contract, however, is that it may be infeasible to describe 
ex ante what constitutes “winning” the innovation race (see Tirole 1999). Then firms can claim 
to have won with a mediocre improvement (hoping that they will be able to realize soon a truly 
successful innovation and earn monopoly rents for a portion of the t months), a third party cannot 
verify this claim, and so the true first innovator may get no particular incentive.  
                                                       
11 If a plaintiff with a preliminary injunction loses at trial it must make up the defendant’s lost profits, however, there is 
significant risk that the lead time advantage will not be fully compensated for in this case.  
12 This approach has the additional disadvantage that it may run afoul of antitrust regulations, but I will temporarily 
ignore that consideration and rule out such licensing on other grounds. 10 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
Given these various problems, the winner of the innovation race will at best be able to 
capture only a small fraction of the total lead time advantage in a cross-license, and this value 
will be less than in the non-assertion case:13 
Proposition 1. The value of the lead time advantage is greater when firms do not assert 
patents and is less when firms assert patents and outcomes are determined either under a 
cross-license or through litigation. 
This result is important for the following reason. It is widely recognized that lead time 
advantages may make patents unnecessary in some cases. But since these advantages arise from 
the nature of market competition, they are often assumed to arise independently of patent policy. 
The result here, as elaborated below, implies that patent policy affects the value of the lead time 
advantage. Some patent policies may reduce this value and consequently reduce market-based 
incentives to innovate.   
To simplify matters, I assume below that lead time advantages do not enter into the 
cross-licensing calculation. This means that R&D incentives are slightly understated for the case 
of cross-licensing, however, the general import of the model is unaffected. 
II. Equilibrium Behavior and Normative Results 
Equilibrium solutions 
This game has a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies that is one 
of three types:  
1.  Deterrence, where one firm obtains so many patents that the other firm 
chooses not to enter. This equilibrium only exists for some range of 
parameters. I am interested in the range where deterrence does not occur, so I 
ignore this equilibrium. 
2.  Mutual non-aggression, where neither firm patents.14  
3.  Portfolio cross-licensing, where both firms build large portfolios and cross-
license them to each other. 
                                                       
13 One can envision other, more complex, models where, perhaps, a larger share of lead time advantage could be captured 
under a cross-license. For instance, if a cross-license term is five years, then a firm may capture lead time advantages on innovations 
occurring during the term of the license. But then firms may take such possibilities into account when constructing the license or, 
perhaps, when negotiating the subsequent license. Nevertheless, it does seem that much of the lead time advantage is lost simply 
because under a cross-license the other firm can lay claim to some share of it. 
14 As noted above, if firms needed to acquire a minimum number of patents to deter knock-off imitators, then they would 
acquire this (small) number instead of zero patents in this equilibrium. 11 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
The calculations of the equilibrium values are shown in the Appendix. For mutual non-
aggression, the expected net discounted profit of each firm is  ( )
N N N x W W ˆ =  where “N” 
signifies non-aggression and 
N x ˆ  is the firm’s optimal level of R&D. This is determined by the 
first order condition: 
(3)  ( )
C M N N N N N V f r V f x h r I x h r x h I ) 1 ( )) ˆ ( ( , ) ˆ ( 2 ) ˆ (
2
- + + º + = ¢ ×  
The variable 
N I  may be thought of as the “R&D incentive.” Given the concavity of h, the 
equilibrium R&D level is increasing in 
N I . A larger incentive corresponds to more R&D. 
For the cross-licensing equilibrium,  ( ) n x W W
L L L ˆ , ˆ =  where “L” signifies licensing, an 
additional first order condition determines the firm’s optimal patent portfolio size, n ˆ (see 
Appendix), and the optimal level of R&D is determined by: 
(4)  ( )
x C
V r
I x h r x h I
L
L L L L
¶ ¶ +
º + = ¢ ×
1
, ) ˆ ( 2 ) ˆ (
2
 
Given the structure of the game, in stage one both firms will select whichever strategy yields the 
greater equilibrium profits in stage three. For a given set of parameters, one can define a unique 
boundary value of the lead time advantage ) , (
L C V V S f f =  
(5) 
L N L C W W f V V S f = = such that ) , ( . 
Then, if  f f > , firms will choose the non-aggression equilibrium and vice versa. This is shown 
in Figure 2, which plots a phase diagram. On the vertical axis, from zero to one, is the industry 
lead time advantage,  f; on the horizontal access is the industry ratio of 
L C V V . Then industries 
in the region above  ) , ( 0
L C V V S f  choose non-aggression while those below choose cross-
licensing. In general terms, firms prefer cross-licensing when the lead time advantage is small 
and dissipation of rents from competition is large. Firms choose mutual non-aggression when 
there are large lead time advantages and/or little competitive dissipation of rents. 
Patent Standards and Cross-Licensing 
Numerous observers have suggested that patent thickets may be related to lower 
standards at the patent office (Gallini, 2002, Shapiro, 2001). Historically, the first evidence of 
strategic patent portfolio behavior and the first patents pools in the U.S. arose following a 
significant reduction in patent examination standards. The standards for patent examination were 
sharply reduced during the late 1840s and early 1850s when the scientists who conducted patent 12 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
examinations were replaced by “liberalizers” who accepted a much larger percentage of patent 
applications (Post, 1976). This change in standards was followed within a few years by evidence 
of patent thicket behavior. In 1856, a group of firms jointly acquired a dominant position in 
sewing machine patents and formed the first patent pool. Also during the 1850s, the Draper 
Company acquired a dominant patent position for loom temples and began a long term practice 
of aggressively using patent thickets (Draper, 1903, Mass, 1989).15  
This suggests a possible connection between low patent standards and aggressive patent 
strategies. In fact, the following holds (see Appendix): 
Proposition 2. Cross-licensing and patent standards. As long as 
M C V V 2
1 < and 
0
)) ( ˆ ), ( ˆ , (
>
S d
S x S n S C d
, an increase (decrease) in patenting standards, S, decreases 
(increases) the range over which cross-licensing occurs and increases (decreases) the range 
over which mutual non-aggression occurs. 
The first condition is simply the existence of dissipation of rents under competition. The 
second condition means that the demand for patents is not highly elastic. Both are reasonable 
conditions. The intuition is then simple: cheap patents make patent thickets more affordable. 
The effect of an increase in patentability standard S is shown in Figure 2, where 
0 1 S S > . The region where cross-licensing occurs is reduced with a higher patenting standard. 
Socially Optimal R&D  
The optimal R&D investments allocated by a social planner can also be calculated. The 
first order condition is for each firm to invest 
Soc x ˆ  in R&D (see Appendix): 
(6)  ( )
Soc Soc Soc Soc Soc V r I x h r x h I º + = ¢ × , ) ˆ ( 2 ) ˆ (
2
 
where “Soc” designates the social planner, and 
Soc I  is the R&D incentive 
This can be compared with similar expressions in (3) and (4). Given this comparison, 
Proposition 3. Social efficiency of R&D. Under cross-licensing, as long as  2
1 - > ¶ ¶ x C , 
firms invest less than the socially optimal amount in R&D and social welfare is also sub-
optimal. Under mutual non-aggression, firms may invest too little, or, if the lead time 
advantage, f, is large enough, they may invest too much in R&D. 
                                                       
15 A comparison of the Japanese and U.S. patent systems provides another suggestive example. The Japanese system 
grants many more (but narrower) patents per product; this is seen as encouraging cross-licensing (Ordover, 1991, Cohen et al, 2003). 13 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
R&D is socially sub-optimal under cross-licensing because the innovation rents are 
shared, making each firm’s incentive too low. Under mutual non-aggression, a lead time 
advantage can provide stronger incentives and a more nearly socially optimal (or perhaps even 
supra-optimal) level of R&D. Note that this Proposition does not consider the full calculation of 
social welfare, which also needs to take deadweight loss into account; deadweight loss will, in 
general, be larger under cross-licensing than under non-aggression, where competition dissipates 
more rents to consumers. 
Given that patenting costs are usually much smaller than R&D costs ( C<<x), the 
condition,  2
1 - > ¶ ¶ x C , will be met as long as C is not highly elastic with respect to x. This 
condition says, in effect, that innovation is the main driver of R&D, not the associated reduction 
in patenting cost, which is likely to be quite small. If it is small, then R&D incentives under 
cross-licensing will fall substantially short of the optimal level. 
These results contrast with the simple patent race literature because the models in that 
literature assume that the winner of the innovation race is also the sole winner of a monopoly 
patent right. This is a very strong form of lead time advantage (although not market based). This 
strong incentive means that R&D may be excessive and, so, these models propose using patent 
policy instruments, such as patent term and scope, to reduce the incentive.16 For example, a finite 
patent term limits the period over which monopoly rents can be collected. 
But with patent thickets, even an infinite term may be insufficient to provide adequate 
incentives. In a sense, patent thickets may be viewed as an instance where the private actions of 
firms counteract policy. Policies based on the patent race models may be subject to a Lucas-type 
critique: if the government establishes a short patent term, firms will build portfolios of patents 
staggered over time to achieve a long term patent position. If the government establishes a 
narrow patent scope, firms will build large portfolios of many related patents to achieve a very 
broad patent position. These actions increase the market power of individual firms, taking the 
actions of other firms as a given. But when multiple firms pursue patent thicket strategies, the net 
result may be an equilibrium with less R&D. In effect, patents substitute for R&D as a source of 
competitive advantage. 
                                                       
16 This literature includes Nordhaus (1969),  Lee and Wilde (1980), Loury (1979) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), using 
patent term as an instrument and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Klemperer (1990), Gallini (1992), and Denicolo (1996) use patent scope 
or breadth. 14 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
Socially Optimal Standards 
But this model suggests an alternative policy instrument, namely, patenting standards, S. 
Since patenting standards affect the choice between aggressive cross-licensing and non-
aggression, they can be used to influence that choice. This may not achieve socially optimal 
R&D, but it may be second best optimal. 
First, it is necessary to decide where each strategy generates greater R&D. 
Straightforward calculation shows that for a given set of parameters, there is a unique value of 
the lead time advantage f such that 




L N L C I I f V V f = = such that ) (
~
. 
Given (1), this variable is independent of S. Then for industries where  f f
~
> , non-aggression 
generates larger R&D incentives, since 
N I  increases with f; when  f f
~
< , cross-licensing 
generates higher levels of R&D. This is shown as a dashed line in Figure 3. Below this curve, 
cross-licensing generates higher R&D; above it, mutual non-aggression generates more R&D. 
Assuming that mutual non-aggression is still socially preferable when it generates supra-
optimal R&D, the socially optimal policy will select whichever equilibrium generates the higher 
level of R&D spending as long as the monopoly deadweight loss is not large. In general, 
deadweight loss will be greater under cross-licensing than under mutual non-aggression where 
firms compete. So in some cases, non-aggression may be a socially preferred outcome even when 
it generates lower R&D incentives. To keep things simple, I ignore this case. Then the socially 
optimal policy is: 
Proposition 4. Optimal patenting standards. Assuming that mutual non-aggression is socially 
preferable to cross-licensing in the case where 
Soc N x x ˆ ˆ > , and ignoring deadweight loss, 
then the socially optimal patenting standard for a single industry is determined as follows: 
 
If   ,
~
f f <  then the socially optimal standard is S = 0 (or S is sufficiently small), so that 




f f ³  then the socially optimal standard is sufficiently high so that 
L N W W ³ . Then 
no firms will assert patents. 
An example of this policy can be seen in Figure 3. For an industry at point A, patenting 
standard  1 S  is second best optimal, but  0 S  is not.  15 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
In general, this policy suggests that patenting standards should be either very low or very 
high, depending on the industry. The first alternative, when  ,
~
f f <  corresponds roughly to a 
system of patent registration17 at low cost, and strong, pro-patentholder enforcement. Such low 
patenting standards are desirable if lead time advantages are small and/or the industry is not very 
innovative ( r x h
N << ) ˆ ( ) and competition dissipates most rents ( 0 »
C V ).  
If, instead, the industry is innovative (high h) or there are substantial lead time 
advantages or competition is “softer,” then high patenting standards are preferable. This second 
policy sets patent standards high so that patenting is costly and few (or no) patents are acquired. 
Such high standards include the case where there are no patents for an industry, e.g., software 
subject matter exclusion (recall, I have ignored the problem of knock-off imitation). 
This is, of course, a policy tailored to an individual industry. Policy analysts sometimes 
argue that industry-by-industry regulation is subject to capture by rent-seekers and therefore they 
prefer a “one-size-fits-all” approach to patent regulation. As I argue below, the one-size approach 
has its own political economic limitations. Nevertheless, if a single patenting standard has to 
apply to all industries, then a more complicated analysis must be performed. The empirical 
literature finds that many industries do have substantial lead time advantages (Levin et al, 1987, 
Cohen et al, 2000), suggesting a policy of high patenting standards. But a “one-size-fits-all” 
policy would have to temper high standards a bit so that socially wasteful patenting and 
“inventing around” expenditures are not too large in industries that do cross-license portfolios. 
For example, if the industries in Figure 3 are distributed uniformly in both dimensions, then  1 S  
might be an optimal single standard—most industries cross-license where this is preferable and 
vice versa, but some industries are mismatched. 
Finally, note that this analysis suggests skepticism about the welfare effects of cross-
licensing. Extensive cross-licensing may well be an indicator that patenting standards are too low 
and, consequently, R&D incentives are sub-optimal. In the context of a strictly static efficiency 
analysis, cross-licenses can permit more efficient outcomes (Shapiro, 2001). But excessive cross-
licensing generated by low patenting standards is dynamically inefficient.  
                                                       
17 Under a registration system, acquiring a patent simply involves registering it with the patent office; it is not examined. 
Britain and the U.S. initially had registration systems, but litigation rates were high, making expected costs high as well. 16 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
III. Extension to Sequential Innovation in a Single Market 
Drastic Innovation with an Incumbent Firm 
Next, I extend the basic model to the situation where one firm is an incumbent. This 
extension corresponds to the models in the literature on sequential replacement that study the 
persistence of monopoly (see Reinganum, 1989, for a review). The primary focus here, however, 
is to explore the distributional aspects of cross-licensing and patenting standards. 
Suppose that everything is the same as in the duopoly case above except that firm A has 
an existing product that will be replaced by the new innovation that either firm A or B can invent 
(“drastic” innovation in the same market). Let firm A earn a stream of monopoly rents of 
M V u r × ×  on this existing product until the new innovation is marketed. The variable u is the 
ratio of the monopoly rent on the old technology to the rent on the new technology. It may be 
treated roughly as a measure of industry maturity. In more mature industries, innovations tend to 
be more incremental, resulting in smaller gains relative to the previous technology. Let 
1 0 < < u  so that the monopoly profits on the new innovation, 
M V , are greater than the 
monopoly profits on the old innovation. 
Since I wish to explore the distributional effects related to cross-licensing, I make several 
simplifying assumptions. First, I assume that each firm invests a fixed amount in R&D,  x , and 
innovates first (second) with a probability of  2
1 . The first innovation occurs instantly, so initial 
discounting can be ignored (but there is still a lead time advantage). This lets me focus on the 
effect of u on post-innovation outcomes (rents on the existing product may also diminish A’s 
R&D incentives, but I ignore this effect here). Second, I let  n S n S C × = ) , ( ; in other words, S 
corresponds to a fixed marginal cost of patenting. Finally, I assume that the patents acquired on 
the existing product do not intersect at all with the patents on the new product. On the one hand, 
this means that the patent position on the existing product cannot be challenged. More important, 
it also means that the incumbent firm’s initial patents cannot be used to holdup the entrant if the 
entrant innovates. This is a strong simplifying assumption. In practice, most sequential 
improvements do infringe previous technology and because of this, the incumbent can obtain a 
larger share of the rents from the innovation with licensing. Below I show that incumbents obtain 
a majority of the rents without holdup, so allowing holdup in this case would only strengthen 
these distributional effects. 17 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
Industry maturity, u, affects the bargaining for a cross-license in the case that both firms 
win at litigation (mutual blocking). This happens because firm A continues to earn a profit 
stream of 
M V u r  during negotiations, making A the more patient bargainer (or, alternatively, u 
alters the “threat point” of negotiations). Above, where the profits under a negotiated settlement 
to mutual blocking were { }
M M V V 2
1
2
1 ,  in the symmetric model, now they are 
{ }
M M V u V u ) 1 ( , ) 1 ( 2
1
2
1 - +  (see Appendix). This change in the litigation outcome tilts the 
cross-license in favor of firm A. 
Given these additional assumptions, the equilibrium net expected profit for each firm 
under mutual non-aggression licensing is (assuming an interior solution) 
(8)  x V f V f W
C M N - - + = ) 1 ( 2
1 . 
This is equivalent to the solution in the symmetric model given in (3) with a zero discount rate 
during the Poisson race. An incumbent’s profits on its existing product have no effect after 
innovation occurs. 
With cross-licensing, the firms earn different profits after innovation, regardless of 
which firm makes the innovation. The equilibrium net expected profits are (see Appendix) 
(9)  ( )
( ) x n S V u n q n q n q n q W
x n S V u n q n q n q n q W
B
M
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The values of  A n ˆ  and  B n ˆ are found by solving first order conditions. In general, for u > 0, 




A W W > . The intuition behind this result is simple. Because the incumbent firm 
makes out relatively better when mutual blocking arises, firm A’s incentive to obtain patents is 
greater. It obtains more patents and a correspondingly larger share of the profits of the 
innovation, regardless of whether the innovation is made by firm A or B. 
Given this inequality, the boundary between non-aggression and licensing equilibria 
depends solely on the choice of firm A. Firm A will choose to assert patents in some situations 
where firm B would prefer a non-aggressive equilibrium. Now the boundary between equilibria 




N L C W W f V V S f = = such that ) , ( . 
Cross-licensing occurs when it is in firm A’s interest to cross-license. 
As above, this paper does not consider deterrence strategies, although with positive u, 
firm A will generally choose deterrence over a greater range of parameter values. 18 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
Who cross-licenses? 
These results indicate a distributional aspect to cross-licensing and to patent policy.  
Some empirical evidence suggests that industry maturity is related to aggressive cross-licensing 
and heavy patenting. In a study of 46 new technologies, Gort and Klepper (1982) find that 
patenting rates are highest in the most mature industries, although innovation rates are lower 
then. This could be because mature industries are more likely to engage in aggressive portfolio 
licensing as opposed to mutual non-aggression. 
Interpreting u as a measure of industry maturity, the following result provides a possible 
theoretical explanation to Gort and Klepper’s result (see Appendix). 
Proposition 5. Industry Maturity and Cross licensing. In an industry with a larger value of u 




A . Also, cross-




Thus, in a general sense, incumbent firms make out better in mature industries and some 
incumbents in mature industries will choose cross-licensing because they find this more 
profitable. Low patenting standards can also make cross-licensing more profitable by reducing 
patenting costs, as in Proposition 2. 
But do low patenting standards actually benefit incumbent firms? They do as long as the 
demand for patents is not too elastic (see Appendix): 






















 is the elasticity of demand for patents in the absence of strategic 
interaction.  The condition that this ratio be larger than -1 ensures that increases in the marginal 
cost of patenting will not decrease the total cost of patents. This is a reasonable assumption and it 
holds for many common distribution functions that might be used to model  ) (× q .18 
                                                       
18 The function q can be interpreted as a distribution function of the value of patents. Empirical studies based on patent 
renewal data typically find a highly skewed distribution of patent values. These studies use lognormal or Pareto distributions for the 
value of patents. Both of these functions meet the elasticity requirement in the appropriate range (the upper tail of the lognormal).  19 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
Incumbent firms do, indeed, have some incentive to promote lower patenting standards. 
Of course, a complete political economic analysis must consider the incentives of other groups, 
such as the patent bar, that may also have strong incentives regarding patenting standards. But 
this result does imply that a “one-size-fits-all” patent policy may not be immune from significant 
political concerns. 
IV. Conclusion 
A patent is held to be a form of “intellectual property” because it grants exclusive 
ownership over a productive asset. According to two arguments, ownership provides the 
strongest incentives for efficient use of the asset, either because monopoly ownership generates 
the largest rents, hence the strongest ex ante incentives (the Nordhaus incentive argument), or 
because a sole owner can most efficiently coordinate ex post development and commercialization 
(the Kitch prospect argument).  
The model presented here suggests that patents may be an inefficient or defective 
property right if technologies are complex and patent standards are low. This is because patents 
do not, in fact, convey exclusive ownership over the relevant productive assets when a single 
technology involves large numbers of patents. The patent race model and the prospect model of 
patents depend on the crucial assumption that a productive innovation uniquely corresponds to 
just a single patent. 
But when technologies are complex and standards are low, ownership is shared and the 
rents earned on an innovation are shared as well. This means that innovation incentives are too 
low even with efficient contracting and ignoring entry deterrence. Moreover, patents do not 
merely fail to provide sufficiently strong incentives in this case; they may also destroy the 
market-based incentives of lead time advantages. In effect, with low standards and complex 
technologies, patents serve to subsidize the losers of innovation races (paid by the winners), 
especially if those losers are large patent holders in mature industries. Schumpeterian 
competition is blunted. 
Schumpeterian competition and more optimal R&D levels can be sustained in industries 
with lead time advantages if patenting standards are sufficiently high (or if few patents are 
granted, as in the software industry historically). But competition is not enhanced by reducing 
patenting standards, even if such changes “strengthen” patents in the sense of making patents less 
costly to obtain or otherwise favoring patent holders. 20 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
Much of the literature discussing patent thickets has focused on potential problems of 
transaction costs, holdup and vertical monopoly. This paper demonstrates that patent thicket 
strategies can discourage innovation even without these problems. This means that although 
cross-licensing and patent pools may resolve some problems of transaction cost and vertical 
monopoly, these institutions do not correct all problems associated with patent thickets. 
Finally, this paper ignores the effect of patent thickets on entry. Patents may protect 
entrants (e.g., Hall and Ziedonis, 2001), but thickets force entrants to develop a portfolio quickly, 
possibly providing a barrier to entry. This effect remains to be explored. 
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Appendix 
Equilibria and First Order Conditions 
Value of cross-license 
I derive the bargaining solution for the cross-license and first order conditions for the 
asymmetric case. The symmetric case is the instance where industry maturity u = 0. First, I solve 
the bargaining problem for the situation where firms have mutually blocking patents. In this case, 23 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
the “threat point” to a Nash bargaining solution for firms A and B is { } 0 ,
M V u× ; by cooperating, 
the firms can realize joint profits of 
M V . The bargaining solution is then 
{ }
M M V u V u ) 1 ( , ) 1 ( 2
1
2
1 - + . The same solution can be obtained with a Rubinstein-Stahl model 
where firm A earns rents of  dt V u r
M × ×  each bargaining cycle of infinitesimal duration, dt 
(Binmore et al, 1986). 
Given this solution to the case of mutual blocking, I calculate the total expected value of 
litigation for each firm,  B A i Ti , , = . Given legal costs, L, and probability of winning at 
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On the other hand, if the firms cooperate, their joint profits are 
M V . Solving this Nash 
bargaining problem, the cross-license provides profits, ignoring patenting and R&D costs, of 
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Asymmetric licensing equilibrium 
This value can be used to calculate the expected present value under the cross-licensing 
equilibrium. The calculation here is somewhat different under the symmetric and asymmetric 
models in the text because the asymmetric model does not involve time discounting. For the 
asymmetric case, the value of cross licensing is by straightforward calculation 
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where  A n ˆ  and  B n ˆ  solve the first order conditions: 
(A4)  (a)   ( ) S n q V u n q A
M
B = ¢ + ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( 1 2
1   (b)  ( ) S n q V u n q B
M
A = ¢ - ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( 1 2
1 . 
Comparing these two conditions, for positive u,  A n ˆ  and  B n ˆ , it must be true that 
) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( A B n q n q ¢ > ¢ . Given the concavity of q, this means that  B A n n ˆ ˆ > . And from this it can easily 
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Symmetric licensing equilibrium 
For the symmetric case, time discounting matters and  0 = u . Assuming that the firms 
cross-license as soon as one of them discovers the innovation, the expected value for the ith firm, 
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By the symmetry of the problem, the Nash equilibrium will have  n n n B A ˆ ˆ ˆ = =  and 
L
B A x x x ˆ ˆ ˆ = = . Taking first derivatives and applying the symmetry condition, the Nash 
equilibrium has an expected value for each firm of 
L W  with first order conditions: 
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and I is the R&D incentive. 
Mutual Non-aggression equilibrium 
For mutual non-aggression in the symmetric case,  
(A7) 
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Again, a symmetry condition applies, 
N
B A x x x ˆ ˆ ˆ = = . Taking derivatives and applying the 
symmetry condition yields a Nash equilibrium expected profit and first order condition 25 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
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Finally, consider the socially optimal level of R&D. The social planner is indifferent to 
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Solving, again the solution is symmetric, 
Soc
B A x x x ˆ ˆ ˆ = =  
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Outline of Proofs of Propositions 
Proposition 2 
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, this will be negative. The changes in equilibria follow. 
Proposition 5 




A . Given this 
result, and because 
N W  is independent of u, an increase in u means greater value of 
L
A W  such 
that  f  must be larger in order to maintain the equality condition in (10), so  0 >
u d
f d
. 26 – Patent Thickets - Bessen  
Proposition 6 
First, it is helpful to define reaction functions 
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Then the Nash equilibrium condition can be written 
(A12)  ( ) ) , ˆ ( ˆ , ), , ˆ ( ˆ S n R n S S n R R n B A A B A B B = =  
Taking the implicit derivative, 













































Then, evaluating the partial derivates as implicit derivatives from (A4), straightforward 
calculation yields the following useful result: 




























































the latter by the envelope theorem and (A4b). Then by the Lemma and since  B A n n ˆ ˆ > , it follows 
that 










a. R&D:  B A x x ,  
b. Signal patenting rate 
 
a. Patent portfolios:  B A n n ,  
b. Poisson “race” 
    Hazards:  ) ( ), ( B A x h x h  
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CROSS-LICENSE 
Bargaining solution Figure 2. Phase Diagram of Cross-Licensing and Mutual Non-aggression 
Notes: 
L N L C W W f V V S f = = such that ) , (  
 
0 1 S S >  
 
The shaded area represents the region where the firms choose the cross-licensing 
equilibrium under patentability standard  0 S ; this is also the area where profits under 
cross-licensing are greater, 
N L W W >  under this standard. Firms choose a non-
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    stricter std. 
Lead Time 
Advantage 































L N L C W W f V V S f = = such that ) , (  
 




0 1 S S >  
 
The shaded area represents the region where R&D incentives are greater under cross-
licensing, 










) ( 0 S f  
    lower std. 
) ( 1 S f  
    stricter std. 
Lead Time 
Advantage 
Duopoly Profit / License Profit 
R&D greater under 
cross-license 
A ￿  
f
~
 
R&D greater 
under non-aggression 